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ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES:
STATUTORY REFORM

A PROPOSED

I. INTRODUCTION

There is no way our savings institutions can remain viable..
without the widespread use of ARMs.1
As a solution to rising interest rates, ARMs could prove to be
the cure that is worse than the disease.'
Imagine that the year is 1978. Home mortgage interest rates are
below ten percent and there are only faint signs of dramatic interest
rate increases on the horizon. The traditional thirty-year fixed-rate
mortgage is enjoying unprecedented popularity. Our protagonist,
Mr. Van Winkle, purchases one such traditional mortgage from his
neighborhood savings and loan. Satisfied with the economic stability
and financial calm of the day, Van Winkle decides to take an eightyear nap, a sleep slightly longer than the average life of a home
mortgage. 8
The year is now 1986. Van Winkle awakens and visits his old
savings and loan institution to see about financing a new home. After
meeting with a loan officer, however, Van Winkle is confounded. He
sees a home financing world which he scarcely recognizes. Although
interest rates are similar to their 1978 levels, there is a mind-boggling array of mortgage instruments from which to choose. The familiar fixed-rate mortgage is now commonly referred to as an
"FRM," and it is joined by new instruments known as ARMs,5
© 1986 by David W. Miller.
1. Adjustable Rate Mortgages [ARMs], Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Housing and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1984) (statement of Edwin Gray, Chairperson, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings].
2. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 39 (statement of Rep. Wirth).
3. The average life of a home mortgage is seven years. Reichelt, SAMs, Recognizing
Economic Reality, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1981, at 30, 31.
4. The fixed rate mortgage was introduced in the 1930s as an alternative to the shortterm "balloon" mortgages that were linked to numerous mortgage defaults during the Great
Depression. Comment, The Due-on-Sale Clause and Alternative Mortgage Instruments, 1981
DET. C.L. REV. 1105, 1106. The FRM is characterized by a relatively lengthy term (usually
20-30 years), a fixed interest rate for the life of the loan, and monthly payments that are also
fixed. See, e.g., Walleser, Balancing The Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mort-
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AMLs,6 GPMs, 7 GEMs,8 PLAMs, 9 SAMs,' 0 and RAMs."
Van Winkle's head is spinning; purchasing a home mortgage in
1986 is like trying to make sense out of alphabet soup. To further
complicate matters, Van Winkle learns that there is also a host of
other new considerations in today's mortgage instruments, elements
known as teaser rates," payment caps," interest rate caps, 4 life-ofgage Financing in America, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1981-82). An FRM which requires the
borrower to make payments on a bi-weekly basis has become increasingly popular in the mid1980s. The bi-weekly payments lead to a shorter amortization period and a dramatically reduced total payment amount than the same mortgage paid in monthly installments. See The
Yuppie Mortgage: Instrument of the 1980s, MORTGAGE BANKING, August 1985, at 87, 88.
5. Adjustable Rate Mortgages. These mortgages are characterized by a fluctuating interest rate linked to an index that will rise and fall with market conditions. See, e.g., Quinn,
Escalating the ARMs Race, NEWSWEEK, March 12, 1984, at 64. In this comment, unless
otherwise noted, the term "ARMs" will encompass all types of adjustable rate mortgages.
6. Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans. These are adjustable rate mortgages without any
limit placed on periodic or aggregate adjustment of interest rates. Sweat, AMLs, GPAMLs,
ARMs: Updated Look at the Differences, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1982, at 16, 17.
7. Graduated Payment Mortgages. Payments increase at a predetermined rate each year
during the first few years of the mortgage (usually five), and are then adjusted to a fixed
amount for the remaining period. lezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on
Residential Financing, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 3, 10-12 (1981). The graduated payment feature of the GPM can also be combined with the adjustable feature of the ARM to produce a
Graduated Payment Adjustable Rate Mortgage, or "GPARM." Id.
8. Growing Equity Mortgages (also known as Accelerated Payment Rate Mortgages, or
"APRMS"). Mortgage payments are adjusted upward each year according to a specified percentage of the annual increases in a borrower's adjusted disposable income. The increased
payments are used to reduce the principal so that the loan is usually paid off in 10-15 years,
instead of 30 years. See Roth, Growing Equity Mortgage: Equitable Compromise?, MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1982, at 10, 11-12.

9. Price Level Adjusted Mortgages. Monthly payments, rather than remaining constant
in terms of current dollars, are constant in terms of their purchasing power as measured by a
price index such as the Consumer Price Index. Thus, for example, a $500 monthly payment
would increase to $550 during a period of 10% inflation. See, e.g., McCulloch, Affordability
and Inflation Protection, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 1982, at 8.

10. Shared Appreciation Mortgages. The interest rate on the note is typically written at
approximately two-thirds of the current market rate, thus lowering the borrower's monthly
payments, and permitting more borrowers to qualify for financing. In exchange, the borrower
agrees contractually to return to the lender between 40-50% of the property's appreciation
when the loan matures. The note maturation date is often 10 years after the loan is originated,
although monthly payments are amortized over a thirty-year period. Reichelt, SAMs: Recognizing Economic Reality, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1981, at 31, 35; Angell & Wardrep,
SAM: Evaluating the Shared Appreciation Mortgage, MORTGAGE BANKING, Apr. 1981, at

31-33.
11. Reverse Annuity Mortgages. The lender makes a fixed number of periodic payments
to the borrower, who agrees to repay this amount, plus interest, upon either the maturity date
of the mortgage, or the borrower's death, whichever is earlier. Typically written for retired
homeowners, the RAM provides homeowners with the use of both their home and the equity
therein. Sjogren & Feins, Home Equity Conversion Through Reverse Annuity Mortgages: An
Income Supplement for the Elderly, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J., Jan. 1983, at 15, 18.

12.

Teaser rates are the below-market interest rates which are often used to help induce
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loan caps,"8 negative amortization,' 6 negative amortization caps 17
and something called variable equity. 8 There are also nine fluctuating indices from which to choose, 9 and there is something ominous
called "mortgage payment shock." 20
Van Winkle leaves his lender's office. He is bewildered and
confused by the staggering selection of financing options. He wonders if he should just go back to sleep, or maybe even rent. Like
thousands of other homebuyers in the 1980s, Van Winkle is ill-prepared for the complexity of today's home financing world.
As Van Winkle and numerous others have discovered, the purpose underlying the ARM is to enable institutional lenders"1 to market a loan instrument which ensures that the lender's mortgage yield
correlates with the lender's current cost of funds.22 . To potential
homebuyers, the ARM offers two distinct advantages over the fixedrate mortgage. First, the ARM provides home ownership opportunities to a greater number of people than does the traditional fixed-rate
mortgage because the generally lower ARM rates qualify some people who could not qualify for fixed-rate financing. Second, the flexborrowers to purchase a particular ARM. Teasers are usually in effect only during the first 612 months of the loan. See infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
13. Payment caps limit the amount of a borrower's monthly mortgage payment. See
infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
14. Interest rate caps limit the fluctuation of the loan interest rate, usually on an annual
basis. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
15. Life-of-loan caps limit the fluctuation of the loan interest rate over the life of the
loan. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
16. Negative amortization is the amount of money added to the outstanding loan balance
when the borrower's monthly mortgage payments are insufficient to reduce the outstanding
debt. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
17. Negative amortization caps limit the amount of negative amortization which can be
added to the outstanding loan balance before the lender "recasts" the loan, i.e., adjusts the
monthly payments upward so that the loan becomes fully amortizing. See infra notes 129-30
and accompanying text.
18. Variable equity is the result of negative amortization cutting into the borrower's
equity in the property used to secure the loan. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
19. The interest rate on an ARM is adjusted based on an index beyond the lender's
control. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
20. Mortgage payment shock is the result of increases in a borrower's monthly payments which, if significant, may eliminate the borrower's ability to continue making mortgage
payments. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
21. In this comment, the term "lender" means any individual or business entity that
makes a loan secured by real property. This definition incorporates, essentially, the definition
used by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in its regulations which interpret the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. See 12 C.F.R. § 5 9 1.2 (g) (1984).
22. Harter, Free Lunch for ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, May 1984, at 10-11.
23. An ARM can carry a lower initial rate than its fixed-rate counterpart because its
adjustable mechanism reduces the lender's need to include an inflation or interest rate risk
premium in the loan. J. MEYERS, BUYING AND SELLING A HOME IN TODAY'S MARKET 29
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ible nature of the ARM allows borrowers to tailor their mortgage
payments to their own particular financial situation, a feature which
is unknown to the fixed-rate mortgage. 4
that the ARM helped to restore vigor to
It is generally agreed
25
the housing industry,

despite the presence of interest rates in the

early 1980s which were significantly higher than those of ten years
ago." By the end of 1983, federally-insured savings and loan institutions had more than $100 billion of ARMs in their portfolios, and
the 1984 levels were estimated at twice that amount.2 7 Estimates of
the ARM percentage of home mortgages purchased nationwide in
1983-84 range from sixty 28 to eighty percent. 9 In California, thrift
institutions alone originated over $8 billion in ARMs in 1983 to finance new or existing home purchases for 160,000 households.3
Despite such impressive statistics, the ARM has generated a
storm of controversy. It has been called "an abomination,"' , "the
neutron bomb of the industry (wrecking havoc but leaving buildings
intact)," 2 "sheer extortion,"" and a "loan shark's trap for the unwary."'8 4 And whereas one speaker for the lending industry has la(1983). See also infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. This lower initial rate helps to
attract homebuyers who are confident that their incomes will keep pace with inflation. Runder,
A Buyer's Guide to the New Mortgages, MONEY, July 1982, at 44, 48. Unfortunately, this
lower rate also attracts homebuyers who will be unable to afford rising mortgage payments.
See infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
24. The drawback to mortgage instrument flexibility is that it creates an overwhelming
variety of mortgages from which to choose. This, in turn, makes it difficult for homebuyers to
shop for the best mortgage deal. See infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
25.

See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, POSITION PAPER: LENDER AD-

VERTISING AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES WITH ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES

3 (April 23,

1984) [hereinafter cited as CAR, ARM PRACTICES).

26.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, INTEREST RATE INDICES FOR

(June 1984).
27. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3 (estimate by the U.S. League of Savings Institutions).
28. Id. (estimate by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
29. Lenders Defend ARMs, Note Interest Ceilings, The Los Angeles Times, Aug. 29,
1984, at 6.
30. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3. A total of 160,000 ARMs works out to
an average of one ARM originated every three and one-half minutes throughout every day and
night in 1983. California is a particularly active market for ARMs because the housing affordability problem is greater than in the rest of the country. Id.
31. House Leader Wants to Abolish Variable Rate Loans, San Francisco Examiner,
May 9, 1984, at 7 (statement of House of Representatives Majority Leader James Wright).
32. San Francisco Examiner, April 6, 1984, at 12 (statement of Kent Colton, Exec.
V.P., National Association of Home Builders).
33. Crocker v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n, Etc., 289 N.C. 620, 642, 224 S.E.2d 580, 594
(1976).
34. Id. at 634, 224 S.E.2d 589.
ADJUSTABLE MORTGAGE LOANS I
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beled the fixed-rate mortgage as "financial arsenic," 35 a consumer
advocate has retaliated with the statement that an adjustable rate
mortgage "is arsenic for the homebuyer."s 6
This comment examines the unfair practices associated with
ARMs, and the concomitant need for statutory reform. In the following section, the comment describes the economic, judicial, and
legislative forces which led to the introduction of ARMs. Section III
divides the problems associated with ARMs into five areas, providing
examples of the most serious hidden dangers associated with ARMs.
Section IV proposes congessional reform to address the five problem
areas discussed in Section III. Finally, Section V presents the author's conclusion that immediate congressional action is necessary to
stem the tide of ARM loan defaults and foreclosures.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In truth, the deregulation of liabilities-which the Congress decreed in 1980 would become the law of the land, and which the
Congress reinforced in 1982 with the passage of the historic
Garn-St. Germain Act-made the use of the adjustable rate instrument inevitable.3"
Although ARMs have only been in use since 1981, one needs to
travel farther back in time to understand how and why they were
developed.
Between 1929 and 1966, mortgage interest rates remained at
relatively low levels, between two and six percent."8 As interest rates
then began to inch upward, lenders became concerned that the cost
of securing funds to make new loans was outpacing the return generated by their existing loan portfolios.3 9 As a result, several California
lenders in the mid-1960s attempted to enforce something called an
"escalator clause" 40 in their loans. The lenders' efforts, however,
41
were short-lived due to adverse borrower reaction.
35. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 50 (statement of Edwin Gray).
36. Id. at 344-45 (statement of James Paulson, President, San Jose Real Estate Board,
and Director, National Association of Realtors).
37. Id. at 42 (statement of Edwin Gray).
38. d. at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
39. Holiday Acres, No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. S. & L., Etc., 308 N.W. 2d 471, 481 (Minn.
1981).
40. An escalator clause permits a lender, at its discretion, to raise interest rates on existing mortgages. The clause lacks a provision for a downward adjustment. NEWSWEEK, Oct.
17, 1966, at 80.
41. Borrowers picketed the lenders' offices to protest an attempted 1%interest rate increase in their mortgages. The event was reported in the national press, and the lenders agreed
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In the late 1960s, the disparity between the lenders' existing
loan portfolios and the cost of new money increased.42 In response,
California lenders adopted twin strategies which they and other
lenders around the country would follow for more than a decade.
One strategy involved the use of the due-on-sale clause to ensure that
money was loaned at existing rates.' The parallel strategy involved
lobbying state legislatures (and later, Congress) for legislation which
would provide for a variable rate clause in home mortgages."" Ultito cancel the rate boost and to abolish the escalator clause. Id.
42. Comment, The Due-on-Sale Clause and Alternative Mortgage Instruments, 1981
DET. C.L. REV. 1105, 1107-09.
43. A due-on-sale (or "acceleration") clause permits the holder of a note or beneficiary
of a trust to accelerate the debt if the maker of the note or trustor sells, transfers, conveys, or
disposes of the property without the written consent of the holder. S. FABER, REAL ESTATE
LIENS, ENCUMBRANCES, AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 67-68 (2d ed.) (1979). Historically,
the principal purpose of the clause was to protect the lender's security interest by ensuring the
creditworthiness of the new buyer. The lender's right to accelerate provides the lender with the
opportunity to evaluate the credit of the buyer and accelerate if the buyer is not a good risk.
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest S. & L. Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981). With the rise
of interest rates in the 1960s, the due-on-sale clause became a vehicle, particularly in residential financing, to ensure the lender's position in the money market. Id. at 481. The clause
provided the lender with leverage to negotiate a higher rate of interest, or in the alternative, to
demand the entire balance due. Id; see also Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,
953 n.l, 582 P.2d 970, 976 n.l, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 n.l (1978). In the 1970s, few
areas of mortgage lending generated as much debate and acrimony as the controversy surrounding the lenders' use of the due-on-sale clause. Sanders, A Legal Perspective of "Due-onSale" Loans, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1979, at 29-30. Lenders which enforced the clause
found buyers throughout the country increasingly willing to file court actions seeking to enjoin
the lenders' action. Of the 30 state courts and legislatures which addressed the issue by 1982,
about one-half declared the lenders' actions to be illegal, while the other half reached the
opposite conclusion. See Martin v. Peoples Mutual S. & L. Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220, 230-31
(Iowa 1982). The due-on-sale issue was finally resolved in the lenders' favor by the U.S.
Supreme Court with respect to federally chartered lenders, and by Congress with respect to all
other lenders. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. For an exhaustive list of scholarly
commentary pertaining to the due-on-sale clause, see Cobert, The Due-on-Sale Perspective in
California From Early 1982 to Late 1983: From the "Dawn" of the Current Era to the
"Sunset Date" and Beyond, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 363 n.39 (1983).
44. Variable rate clauses in home mortgages and due-on-sale enforcement produce the
identical result: a closer match between the lenders' loan portfolio returns and the cost of
obtaining new funds. See Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 765, 463 A.2d 242, 249 (1983)
(the adjustable rate mortgage is an alternative device to the due-on-sale clause for controlling
the risk of interest rate fluctuations); Freeman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments and Potential Mortgage Enforcement Problems, 14 URB. LAW. 760, 762 (1982) (the due-on-sale clause
has been sustained on the basis of economic necessity; alternative mortgage instruments diminish or eliminate altogether the economic necessity argument); Comment, Variable Rate Mortgages: The Transition Phase, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 140, 144 n.15 (1977) (due-on-sale clauses
can be eliminated from variable interest mortgages because they will be unnecessary to protect
the lenders' interest in a current rate of return); Volkmer; The Application of the Restraints
on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747, 799 (1973)
(a due-on-sale clause, when used to raise interest rates, "might be thought of as functioning as
a [variable interest rate device), albeit in disguise").
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mately, both strategies were successful; this comment will focus on
the results of the variable rate legislation.
The legislation which was enacted in California in 1970' incorporated the variable interest rate clause 46 sought by the lenders,
and also included consumer safeguards which regulated the frequency and size of the interest rate adjustment. 47 At first, only a few
lenders used the variable interest rate (VIR) mortgages, at least in
' This
part because of a perceived "borrower/consumer skepticism." 48
skepticism subsided in 1975, when the California legislature provided additional consumer safeguards to the VIRs. 9 Encouraged by
surveys which showed that consumers would tolerate tightly-regulated variable rate mortgage instruments, California lenders began
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1985).
46. The variable rate clause differed from the unpopular escalator clause in two important respects: the variable rate clause provided for downward as well as upward movement of
interest rates, and tied the interest rate movement to an external economic indicator, rather
than to the lender's discretion. Comment, The Variable Rate Clause and its Use in California
Real Estate Transactions, 19 UCLA L. REV. 468, 475 (1972).
47. In pertinent part, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1916.5(a) (West Supp. 1985) reads:
(2) The rate of interest shall change not more often than once during any semiannual period, and at least six months shall elapse between any two such
changes.
(3) The change in interest rate shall not exceed one-fourth of one percent in any
semiannual period.
(4) The rate of interest shall not change during the first semi-annual period.
Id.
California's legislation was the first to authorize the use of interest-sensitive mortgages
and also the first to ensure that specific safeguards were present in mortgages containing a
variable rate provision. Comment, Adjustable Interest Rates in Home Mortgages: A Reconsideration, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 742, 748 n.25.
48.

J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 34 (1977).

49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985), as amended in 1975, placed a
2.5% limit (or "life-of-loan cap") on the VIRs. One commentator has speculated that lenders
turned to the VIRs in the mid-1970s not due to the enhanced consumer safeguards in the
statute, but because of the California Supreme Court's decision in Tucker v. Lassen S. & L.
Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). Tucker held that a lender
could not exercise the due-on-sale clause when the borrower sold by an installment land contract unless the lender could establish that the transfer would impair the mortgage security or
increase the chances of default. Id. After Tucker, lenders "presumably acknowledg[ed] that
variations in interest rates through the due-on-sale clause were not likely to remain permissible." J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 34 (1977). Indeed, in 1978,

the California Supreme Court invalidated the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause to increase
interest rates or to demand the loan principal due unless the lender could demonstrate that the
transfer impaired the property securing the loan. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d
943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). Wellenkamp was limited to state-chartered
lenders. Id. Significantly, the Wellenkamp court suggested that the lender's interest in maintaining the return on its portfolio could be protected by using the VIR instead of the due-onsale clause. Id. at952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 975 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.10.
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marketing VIRs in earnest.5 0
During the 1970s, at the federal level, lenders throughout
around the country lobbied Congress51 for the authority to sell a
completely adjustable loan instrument, the adjustable-rate mortgage
(ARM)." For most of the decade, the policy of Congress was that
ARMs were not necessary and perhaps were anti-consumer. 8 By
1978, however, interest rates approached ten percent ""and lenders
with large portfolios of fixed-rate mortgages were suffering huge
losses.5" The lenders argued that ARMs, as well as the due-on-sale
clause, were vital to the lending industry's survival. 6 Congressional
opposition to these arguments melted away as interest rates soared
by the end of the decade."7
With the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
Act of 1980,"s Congress made clear its intention that savers at depository institutions should receive market rates of interest for their
funds.5 9 This action created an environment which mandated the introduction of a flexible mortgage instrument, closely tied to the fluctuating cost of money paid by the lender.6 0 Indeed, in 1982, Con50. See generally Albaum and Kaufman, Survey Analyzes Consumer Attitudes Toward
Variable Rate Mortgages, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1977, at 47.
51. Congress, under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, has the power to
regulate lenders insofar as their activities affect interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
3; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1864). Congress may also regulate intrastate commerce provided that the activity affects interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-54 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Under the prevailing commerce clause
interpretation, a single intrastate transaction is deemed sufficient to affect interstate commerce
where the class of activities is federally regulated. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 165
(1971).
52. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 227 (statement of William Eskridge, Asst.
Prof. of Law, University of Virginia).
53. Id. at 113 (statement of Edwin Gray).
54. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
55. Id. at 227 (statement of William Eskridge).
56. Telephone interview with Mark A. Hiller (January 24, 1985). Mr. Hiller was the
lead attorney in the state appellate court arguments on behalf of Reginald de la Cuesta in de la
Cuesta v. Fidelity Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981),
rev'd, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (applicability of state due-on-sale laws to federally chartered
lenders).
57. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 174 (statement of Professor Jack Guttentag, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1980).
59. Id. This permitted lenders to meet the challenge of attracting and retaining savers in
the face of strong competition from the money market funds. The Act helped to stem the
"disintermediation," or massive savings outflow, which was devastating to the lending industry
in 1979-81. M. DENNIS MORTGAGE LENDING: FUNDAMENTALS & PRACTICES 18 (1983).
60. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Edwin Gray). The flexi-
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gress passed another massive piece of legislation, the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act.61 The Garn Act was designed
to revitalize the housing industry and to ensure "the availability of
home mortgage loans."" The Garn Act seeks to reach these goals, in
part, by granting all non-federally chartered lenders the authority to
issue ARMs,6 3 as well as by preempting state laws which restricted
due-on-sale enforcement.6" The Garn Act is the congressional response to pleas from the nation's lenders. During prolonged hearings
to consider the bill, Congress heard numerous lenders emphasize
that the ability to adjust their loans upward in response to changing
economic conditions was essential to their survival.65 Convinced by
the powerful financial lobbies that the bill was necessary, 6 Congress
passed the Garn Act on the closing night of the ninety-seventh Congress, over the protests of many congressmen who had not even had
ble mortgage instrument was needed because the lenders' loan portfolios were comprised primarily of low interest, fixed-rate mortgages, but the lenders were now paying out high market
rates to their savers.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j (1982).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1980). Non-federally chartered lenders thus achieved parity with
federally chartered lenders in the issuance of ARMs. Federally chartered lenders began issuing
ARMs pursant to regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1981.
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(a) (1984).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982). The Garn Act overturned two decades of California
judicial and legislative law restricting due-on-sale enforcement as well as similar restrictions in
fourteen other states. Additionally, the statute removes the disparity that had been created
earlier in 1982 by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Fidelity First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. de
laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). de la Cuesta permitted federally chartered lenders to enforce
the due-on-sale clause, but left state laws intact regarding enforcement of the clause by state
lenders. In the immediate aftermath of de la Cuesta, there was an exodus of state lenders over
to the federal system in order to obtain the economic benefits of the decision. See Lockyer, de
la Cuesta: FederalDeterminationof Contract and Property Rights? 14 PAc. L.J. 15 (1982).
Since the Garn Act preempted state due-on-sale laws as they applied to all lenders, the need to
transfer to the federal system was obviated.
65. See The Depository Institutions Amendments of 1982: Hearingson S. 2879, H.R.
4603, and H.R. 6267 Before the Subcommittee on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1982) (statement of Roy Green, Chairman of U.S. League of Savings
Associations). With the exception of spokesmen from the AFL-CIO and the National Association of Realtors, all the testimony was given on behalf of lending institutions. Id.
66. The bill satisfies, for the moment, the powerful interests that control the
major financial lobbies in town . . . .The results are likely to be good for the
already powerful institutions, but not good for people who seek home mortgages, hope for assistance at a locally owned bank, or would like to see the
survival of a diverse financial industry that is not dominated by a few remote
and omnipotent-perhaps omnivorous-megabanks.
128 CONG. REc. H8434-35 (daily ed. October 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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the opportunity to read the text of the bill.6
Thus, many factors led to the development of ARMs: the rising
and volatile nature of interest rates over the past two decades; the
lenders' interest in having their loan portfolios cover the cost of obtaining new funds for lending; the controversial use of the due-onsale clause to keep loan portfolios current; the judicial and state legislative restrictions on the lenders' enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause; the lenders' requests for more flexible loan instruments; and
the general deregulatory stance of Congress in the 1980s." Forged
under such varied and tumultuous conditions, it is not surprising
that ARMs emerged as a paradox of attractiveness and imperfection.
III.

ARMs:

THE NEW AMERICAN NIGHTMARE

"The track record shows that where the sky is the limit, the sky
will become the limit."
The premise underlying the introduction and widespread use of
ARMs is that a borrower usually can absorb interest rate volatility
because the borrower's own income is likely to rise.7 0 Yet the variability of ARM mortgage payments increases the uncertainty as to
67. On September 24, 1982, the Senate Committee took the House version of H.R.
6267, and deleted everything in it except for the title and the statement of intent, replaced it
with Senate Bill 2879 and sent it back to joint conference. See generally 128 CONG. REc.
S12,220-50 (daily ed. September 24, 1982). This version of the bill was then distributed to the
House members on the morning of the final day of the session, October 1, 1982. Late that
evening, Rep. St. Germain sought a "closed rule" waiving certain procedural requirements-essentially those prohibiting consideration of the bill without debate. Intense controversy ensued. Rep. St. Germain argued that the rule prohibiting debate was "essential to save
the thrift industry of this country." 128 CONG. REC. H8426 (daily ed. October 1, 1982). Rep.
Mattox countered that "it is wrong just to come in here and restructure the whole banking
industry of this country in the closing hours of this session under a closed rule." Id. at H8429.
Congressmen who supported the closed rule prevailed, however. Id. at H8434. At approximately 9:30 p.m. that evening, the bill was put on the floor for a vote, despite the fact that only
a dozen Congressmen were familiar with it. More debate ensued. "[Tihere is total disagreement as to what is in this bill. Very likely it perpetuates high interest rates-but we don't
know because we don't know what is in this bill. We ought to [refrain from voting] until we
can take a good look at this legislation; none of us knows what it does." Id. at H8429 (statement of Rep. Perkins). Even one of the senior members of the banking committee, Rep. Gonzalez, asked to postpone a vote on the bill because he had not been able to read it. Id. at
H8434-5 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). Despite such concerns, the Garn-St. Germain Act was
passed. Id. at H8434-39.
68. Besides the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, and the Garn Act of
1982, Congress also attempted further deregulation in 1984. The legislation, S. 2851, passed
the Senate, but the House version never emerged from committee. See infra notes 154-55.
69. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
70. Thomas, FreddieMac ARM Guidelines, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1984, at 85.
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whether a borrower will find future payments affordable."' Unlike
the regulated, variable-rate mortgages used by California lenders in
the 1970s, 7 2' ARMs have the potential to fully transfer the interest

rate risk from the lender to the borrower.7 ' This is accomplished by
tying interest rate adjustments to fluctuations in one of several indices which reflect the cost of new money to the lender.7 " Thus, an
ARM, even with numerous safeguards built in,'7 may provide a borrower with virtually no protection against economic forces that may
make the borrower's home unaffordable.
The problems associated with ARMs fall under five major
headings: excessive diversity, teaser rates, payment caps, negative
amortization, and disclosure.
71. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 60 (statement of Edwin Gray).
72. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
73. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3.
74. An ARM may be tied to any regional or national cost of funds index which is
beyond the lender's control. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2a (1984). A lender can also tie ARM payment
adjustments to increases in the amount of the borrower's disposable income (growing equity
mortgage) or to increases in the value of the property securing the mortgage (shared appreciation mortgage). See supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text. The formulas used to calculate
how a particular adjustment will affect the loan rate are often difficult for a borrower to
comprehend. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 1. Additionally, some ARMs may
have a "floor" which prevents the interest rate from falling below the initial interest loan rate.
See Quinn, ARMs May Defy Law of Gravity, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 1, 1984, at 51.
Thus, ARMs which do not permit monthly payments to decrease below the initial payments
are similar to the "escalator" clauses used briefly by California lenders in the 1960s, with the
only significant difference being that the ARM payment adjustments are tied to indices beyond
the lender's control. See supra notes 40-41 and accompany text. In its explanatory pamphlet,
the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco states: "Please note that the movement of an
index may not coincide exactly with changes in your payments. The use of indices varies
among lending institutions and among loan contracts." FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANE OF SAN
FRANCISCO, AN EXPLANATION OF COST OF FUNDS INDEXES USED IN ADJUSTABLE RATE

Aug. 1984, at 1.
75. ARMs are frequently marketed with "caps" on annual payment increases and on
the amount of negative amortization which will be permitted to accrue by the lender. To the
uninformed borrower, such limits may be welcomed as stabilizing factors on the amount of
future payments These "consumer protections," however, retain a nasty surprise for the borrower when the loan is recast. See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
76. Powell v. Phenix Fed. S. & L. Ass'n, 434 So.2d 247, 253 (Ala. 1983). Similarly, the
fixed-rate mortgage now provides less protection against interest rate increases than it once did.
Increasingly, lenders are inserting "call" provisions into fixed-rate mortgages. These provisions
enable the lender to call the loan due at the end of 5-10 years if market rates have risen above
the contract rate. The clause could compel borrowers to sell their properties or refinance their
mortgages at the higher interest rates. Schersehel, Confused by All Those Different Mortgages?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1982, at 85. Call provisions are the manifestation of Gray's theory that fixed-rate mortgages do not necessarily represent a future danger to
lenders "if interest rate risk exposure can be transferred elsewhere." Gray, Bank Board/
Thrift Perspectives, FED. HOME LOAN BANE BOARD J., May/June, 1983, at 4, 5 (italics in
original).
MORTGAGES,

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 26

Excessive Diversity

There exists a vast array of ARMs in the marketplace. Experts
have estimated the number of ARM types to be as low as fifteen to
twenty within a local community, 77 to perhaps as many as 400,00078
in the national marketplace. There seems to be some agreement that
in practice, there are at least 300 ARM types 79 from which a borrower may choose. The number is not static, and is "limited only to
the ingenuity of the marketplace. 8 0
The argument frequently made to support the proliferation of
different types of ARM instruments is that a borrower can now tailor mortgage payments to meet the borrower's own particular
needs."1 Surveys indicate that most borrowers prefer having numer82
ous options from which to choose.
The problem is that the diversity of ARMs engenders "confusion, information overload, and an inability to do effective shopping
and make sensible decisions." 8 8 Shopping costs are raised, 4 and the
Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Edwin Gray).
Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
79. Id. See also Butler, Funding Techniques for ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, April
1985, at 68, 72 (300 types of ARMs); Miller, How Experts View Mortgage Outlook, San
Francisco Examiner, Oct. 14, 1984, (Homes), at 2 (300 types of ARMs; estimate by Mark
Riedy, Exec. V.P., Mortgage Bankers Association of America); Address by Professor Jack
Guttentag, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, to the Annual Conference, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, December 11, 1984 (790 types of ARMs)
[hereinafter cited as Guttentag speech].
80. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Edwin Gray). The staggering number of mortgage choices facing a potential borrower has provided a strong impetus
to the computerization of the mortgage lending industry. For a modest fee, realtors can now
obtain access to a computerized service which locates loans that are tailored to a specific borrower's financial abilities and needs. Sigmund Anderson, president of one such national mortgage network, describes this new service as one way that a potential borrower can deal with
the financing challenge presented by "over 4000" fixed and adjustable rate loan packages
available in California alone. Miller, Computer Jitters Rock Mortgage Industry, San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 4, 1984, (Homes), at 1. Anderson adds that lenders change interest rates
and loan programs "on an average of [once] every eight days." Id.
81. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Edwin Gray).
82. In a survey conducted by the Federal National Mortgage Association, 78% of the
public expressed a preference for having a variety of mortgage options available. Murray,
Consumer Opinion on Mortgages and Housing, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1982, at 10, 12.
83. Subcommitee Hearings,supra note 1, at 119 (statement of Jack Guttentag). See also
Pope and Cortes, Mortgage Instruments: Choices and Trends, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct.
1983, at 13, 14 ("(C]onsumer acceptance of ARMs has been severely impeded by the multiplicity of plans and . . .information overload.").
84. This includes the time spent visiting the lenders' offices as well as the application
fees required in order to obtain all of the facts about a particular loan. Guttentag speech,
supra note 79. Given the diversity and complexity of today's mortgage instruments, numerous
commentators recommend that homebuyers also purchase legal advice before signing any morgage contract. See, e.g., R.IRWIN, THE NEW MORTGAGE GAME viii (1982); Scherschel, Con77.
78.
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multitude of ARM variables makes it extremely difficult for a potential borrower to draw meaningful comparisons among different
ARMs and between ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages.8 5 Loan officers
have also demonstrated that they can occasionally become confused
by the long-range ramifications of a particular loan instrument.8 6
Much debate exists over whether or not excessive diversity of
ARMs is a problem which will be self-correcting. One view holds
that market forces will ensure the survival of popular ARMs while
at the same time drive less desirable loan instruments from the marketplace. 87 This theory is bolstered by the argument that the market's self-correcting mechanisms, when left alone, preserve the opportunity for innovation and refinement in ARM product design.""
This view may indeed be sound when one considers consumer products in general. In the context of ARMs, however, this Darwinian
"survival of the fittest loan instrument" does not work because the
fused by All Those Different Mortgages?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1982, at 85,
86.
85. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 119 (statement of Jack Guttentag). To
illustrate how vexing ARM shopping has become, Professor Guttentag provided the following
example:
Mortgage A looks better than mortgage B because it has a lower initital rate.
Except that the margin over the index is higher on A which makes B look
better. Except that A and B are tied to different ind[ices], and currently A's
index is lower which makes A look better. Except that the rate on A is adjusted
every year while the rate on B is only adjusted every 3 years which makes B
look better. Except that A has a cap on payment adjustments which makes it
look better. Except that B has a lifetime interest rate cap which makes it look
better, and so on.
Id.
See also Thode, Competitive Camparisons, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1985, at 60
("[Blecause of the array of additional variables in an ARM . . . comparisons between ARMs
and fixed-rate mortgages are extremely complicated."). The stress which is created for
homebuyers who are faced with a series of high risk alternatives that are difficult to compare
has led many homebuyers to simply avoid comparison shopping. Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 1, at 232-35 (statement of William Eskridge).
86. Emmerman, One Viewpoint on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1984, at 169,
170. The task of educating loan officers about the particular features of ARMs as those instruments are developed has proven to be a formidable challenge for the lending industry. Cortes
& Schuette, Keeping in Step with ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Dec. 1984, at 8, 11; ARMs
Have Lenders in a Bind, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 2, 1984, (Homes), at 3. Additionally,
the increased number of ARM variables can cause lenders to err in calculating mortgage adjustments. For example, an audit conducted in 1984-85 by the Massachusetts Banking Commission found errors in handling ARM adjustments at all 12 banks and thrifts it surveyed.
Doublecheck The Banks, The Sacramento Bee, reprinted in The Los Angeles Daily Journal,
December 31, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
87. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 111 (statement of Edwin Gray).
88. Id. at 109.
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average borrower lacks the sophistication 9 to intelligently discern
between the multitude of ARMs. This lack of sophistication is
greatly exacerbated by inadequate disclosure practices, 90 thus creating fertile ground for the continuing existence of the least desirable
ARMs. Moreover, because lenders act competitively, 9 there is incentive to continually create new types of ARMs. In fact, that is
exactly what is happening92 as ARMs enter their sixth year in the
marketplace. 93
B.

Teaser Rates

One of the most controversial aspects of an adjustable rate mortgage is the "teaser" rate.94 The purpose of this special rate is to
attract and to qualify potential borrowers who could not otherwise
qualify for financing in the current market.95 Generally praised by
lenders as an effective loan marketing tool,9 the teaser rate has also
89. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 220 (statement of William Eskridge, questioning whether deregulation is appropriate, "given the vulnerability and ignorance of the consumer in the home loan transaction"), at 315 (statement of Harry Snyder, West Coast Director, Consumers Union, noting that "most borrowers do not sufficiently understand ARMs to
comprehend all the extra risks they are accepting"), at 338 (statement of Jack Paulson, noting
that many people who have purchased ARMs "are not aware of what is going to happen
down the line").
90. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 120 (statement of Jack Guttentag). "Existing disclosure ... is not adequate. In fact, it is wretched." Id. See also infra notes 132-50
and accompanying text.
91. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 116 (statement of Jack Guttentag).
92. Id. at 117, 119.
93. The Office of the Comptroller of Currency issued regulations in March, 1981, authorizing national banks to develop and sell ARMs. 12 C.F.R. §§ 29.1-29.9 (1984). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board approved similar authority for federally-chartered savings and
loans and mutual savings banks in April, 1981. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Press Release, Apr. 23, 1981. The FHLBB Regulations are codified at 12 C.F.R. §§545.6-2a through
6-4(b)(4) (1984).
94. The teaser rate is sometimes referred to as a "discount" rate, or "buydown," because the lender reduces the initial mortgage contract rate. Thomas, FreddieMac Guidelines,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1984, at 85, 88. The initial rate usually extends for a six-month
or one year period. Quinn, Escalating the ARMs Race, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1984, at 64.
Occasionally, a third party such as a builder, will offer to pay part of the initial mortgage
payments; this is called a "third-party buydown," or "builder buydown." Subcommitee Hearings, supra note 1, at 117 (statement of Jack Guttentag).
95. CAR, ARM PRAcricFS, supra note 25, at 3. Teaser rates not only encourage borrower demand for housing by making it easier to qualify for a loan, but they also permit a
borrower to qualify for a more expensive home than might be possible under a fixed-rate
scheme. Moser & Whiteley, Short Fuse on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1984, at 22,
24.
96. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 641-42 (statement of James Montgomery
on behalf of the U.S. League of Savings Institutions). Lenders are also encouraged to offer low
initial rates by builders of new homes, sellers of old homes, and the anxious buyers. Miller,
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frequently been maligned by commentators as being the ARM "time
bomb,'

97

because it can easily lead the unsuspecting borrower into

payment shock."
Table 1" below illustrates how an ARM with a teaser rate can
cause payment shock. Assume, for example, that a buyer locates and
agrees to purchase a home for $110,000. The buyer makes a twenty
percent down payment, and must obtain financing for the balance of
$88,000. The market interest rate is 13.5% The buyer tries to obtain
a fixed-rate mortgage at that rate, but is unable to do so because the
buyer lacks the requisite annual income of $48,000.l °
TABLE I

How mortgage rates affect monthly payments
Example is house priced at $110,000 with 20 percent down and $88,000 loan
Monthly
Households
California
payment
not
households
(principal
Income
Interest
qualifying
that qualify
+ interest)
required
rate
7,525,000
1,500,000
$772
$39,000
10%
7,675,000
1,350,000
838
42,300
11
7,875,000
1,150,000
905
45,000
12
7,975,000
1,050,000
939
46,000
12.5
8,038,000
987,000
973
47,800
13
8,157,000
868,000
1,043
50,000
14
8,276,000
749,000
1,113
53,300
15
8,395,000
630,000
1,183
56,100
16
8,487,000
538,000
1,255
59,000
17

Percent
households
qualifying
17.8
15.6
13.3
12.1
11.4
9.6
8.3
7
6.2

The lender then describes an adjustable rate mortgage, offering
to qualify the buyer for the ARM at the first year teaser rate of
eleven percent 101 The buyer purchases the ARM, moves into the
Warning on "Deep Discount" Mortgages, San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 15, 1984, (Homes),
at 1.
97. See, e.g., Moser & Whiteley, Short Fuse on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug.
1984, at 22, 23; Miller, Why a Fixed-Rate Loan is a Good Deal Now, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1984, (Homes), at 1; CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 7.
98. Payment shock is defined as the result of increases in a borrower's monthly payments which, depending upon the amount and frequency of payment increases, as well as the
borrower's income, may eliminate the borrower's ability to continue mortgage payments.
Moser & Whiteley, Short Fuse on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1984, at 22, 23.
99. Table 1,reprinted with permissionfrom San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 23, 1984,
(Homes), at 1.
100. The borrower in this situation would not be alone; only one out of ten California
households qualify for an $88,000 fixed-rate mortgage at 13.5%. See Table 1, supra note 99
and accompanying text.
101. A teaser rate 2.5% below the market rate is common. Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 1, at 477 (statement of David Maxwell, Chairman, Federal National Mortgage
Association). Teaser rates as much as five to seven points below the market rate have been
reported. Quinn, Escalating the ARMs Race, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1984, at 64. The trend in
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home, and makes each of the first year's monthly payments of $838
(See Table 1). During that first year, the buyer feels secure because
the index to which the ARM is tied"' has not moved upward. Just
before the buyer's thirteenth monthly payment, however, the buyer
receives a notice from the lender stating that the interest on the
mortgage has been bumped to sixteen percent' 3 and therefore
monthly payments will now be $1183, a forty-one percent increase. 10 4 At this point the buyer has the choice of permitting the
loan to go into default, or restructuring his lifestyle in order to keep
the house.' 0 5 This is payment shock.
As seen in this example, ARMs with initial interest rate discounts increase the probability of payment shock. This is because
upon termination of the initial rate, such loans mandate an increase
in monthly payments, regardless of whether there is any change in
1984, however, was to keep teaser rates within three percentage points of the market rate.
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 434 (statement of David Maxwell).
102. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
103. The 16% figure is based on the 13.5% index rate, plus a 2.5% margin (or
"spread") added each month to cover the lender's profit and servicing costs. The margin also
helps to protect the lenders against index interest rate increases which might exceed the permissible levels of the loan. The margin may be calculated in a variety of ways such as a
percentage of the loan balance, or as the difference between the teaser rate and the index rate
on the date when the loan was signed. Telephone interview with Ms. Colleen Buckles, Home
Loan Specialist, Bank of America, Santa Clara branch (Jan. 24, 1985). Generally, the margin
is set between two and three percentage points above the index to which the loan is tied.
Miller, Why a Fixed-Rate Loan is a Good Deal Now, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 21, 1984,
(Homes), at 1; Austin, Buyer's Guide Explains ARMs, The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 22,
1984, (Real Estate), at 1. Since the index is not prominently displayed in most ARM documents, borrowers may not be aware that different lenders using the same index often use
different margins to calculate the borrower's monthly payments. CAR, ARM PRACTICES,
supra note 25, at 1, 4.
104. This would constitute a monthly increase of $345. Had interest rates gone up 1%
during the first year, the borrower's 13th monthly payment would have jumped $387 to
$1,225, or 49.76% over his 12th monthly payment. By contrast, one industry spokesperson
speculated that a 20% increase in the borrower's monthly payments "might well cause foreclosure." Address by James Montgomery, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Annual
Conference (Dec. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Montgomery speech].
105. Whether or not it is ethical for a lender to deny a borrower fixed rate financing
(involving monthly payments of $1008) only to then qualify that same borrower for a more
expensive ARM (involving monthly payments of 51183) has been the source of much debate.
See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 339 (statement of Jack Paulson, noting that
the lenders' refusal to qualify borrowers for fixed-rate financing while marketing ARMs
which are ultimately more expensive is "forcing" ARMs on the average consumer). Contra id.
at 44, 54 (statement of Edwin Gray, noting that all borrowers who purchased ARMs "had a
choice" of obtaining fixed-rate or adjustable rate financing). The issue is exacerbated by the
fact that ARMs with low initial rates are inherently risky because the loans are aimed at
qualifying that segment of the homebuying public which has difficulty qualifying at market
rates. Thomas, Freddie Mac Guidelines, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1 1984, at 85, 88.
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the index to which the payment adjustments are tied.'0 6 In California, most ARMs are sold with these initial teaser rates.107 The rates
are, according to one theory, the primary reason why the market
share for ARMs significantly increased in 1983.18 The arrival of
such rates, however, had long been foreseen.' 00
Although the teaser rate qualifies more people for home ownership,'1 ° it exacts a dear price in return: significantly higher monthly
payments when the teaser rate expires,"' as well as a dramatically
higher rate of loan delinquencies." 2 In 1984 the number of home
106. Thomas, Freddie Mac Guidelines, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1, 1984, at 85, 88.
One commentator summarized this phenomenon of sharply rising ARM payments even while
market rates remain steady, by stating that "Isaac Newton would be shocked." Quinn, ARMs
May Defy Law of Gravity, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 1, 1984, at 51. Another commentator
described ARMs with low initial payments as "meretricious instruments" adding:
The adjective, "meretricious," was originally coined to describe London streetwalkers, and it has two connotations, both of which are applicable to the mortgages described here. One connotation is "falsely attractive" meaning that they
look good in the dim light but cannot withstand close scrutiny. The second connotation is "deceptive" in the sense that the customer is exposed to a possible
unpleasant surprise down the road.
J. Guttentag, Recent Changes in the Primary Home Mortgage Market, Apr. 1984, reprinted
in Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 148-49.
107. CAR, ARM PRAcricEs, supra note 25, at 1, 4.
108. Id. at 5 (the recent acceptance of ARMs by consumers is not due to the increased
sophistication and willingness of the public to accept ARMs, but rather to "the aggressive
advertisement . . .of the 'teaser' rate"). Accord Kaplan, Pitfalls in ARM Lending, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1984, 94, 95 (consumer acceptance has been "artificially inspired" by
initial qualifying rates that can lead to payment shock). Between July, 1983, and September,
1983 ARMs as a share of total savings and loan originations jumped from 28% to 50%, reaching nearly 66% by the end of 1983. Address by Edwin Gray, National Council of Savings
Institutions Annual Meeting, Baltimore, MD, May 14, 1984 [hereinafter cited as Gray, Annual Meeting]. This is roughly the same period during which teaser rates on ARMs were
advertised at "2 to 4 or more percentage points" less than fixed-rate mortgages. CAR, ARM
PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3.

109. Comment, The Variable Interest Rate Clause and Its Use in California Real Estate Transactions," 19 UCLA L. REV. 468, 479-80 (1972). The author notes that due to the
existence of borower hostility to any device which may increase one's loan obligation,
"[llenders will probably accede to granting a lower initial interest rate" in order to enhance the
adjustable loan's marketability. Id.
110. See supra Table 1.
111. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
112. Figures for ARM default rates vary. MGIC Corporation, the nation's largest private mortgage insurer, studied 30,000 ARMs, and found that the default rate was 24% higher
than with fixed-rate loans. CAR, ARM PRAcrIcEs, supra note 25, at 9. Congressman Gonzalez, relying on a 1982 survey of 21,100 mortgages conducted by Investors Mortgage Insurance
Company, stated that the ARM default rate was 39% higher than for fixed-rate loans. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1,at 97. A more recent survey conducted by Investors Mortgage placed the risk of default on ARMs at 45% greater than for fixed-rate loans. CAR, ARM
PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 8. For ARMs which have gone through one payment increase,
there is a "50% greater incidence of default" than with fixed-rate mortgages held during the
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loan delinquencies, as well as foreclosures, was higher than at any
time since the Great Depression."' The outlook for the future is
that they will continue to increase. 14
C.

Caps

There are three types of caps: annual payment caps, periodic
interest rate caps, and life-of-loan caps." 5 Each is designed to prosame period. Warning System is Urged for Adjustable Loans, San Francisco Examiner, Dec.
9, 1984, (Homes), at 2 (quoting James Aylward, President, Investors Mortgage Insurance
Co.). In response to such statistics, the position of the lending industry appears to be that the
ARM default figures are not reliable. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 601 (statement
of Felix Beck, President, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, noting that "[w]e do not
have sufficient data to make a proper analysis"), at 643 (statement of James Montgomery on
behalf of the U.S. League of Savings Institutions, noting that "most ARM originations are too
recent for there to be any reliable data at all"), at 697 (statement of William Dwire, on behalf
of the American Bankers Association, noting that "as yet there is no empirical data on the
delinquency of ARMs as compared to fixed-rate mortgages").
113. Subcommitee Hearings,supra note 1, at 23 (statement of Rep. Wright). The high
number of home foreclosures has also contributed to an escalation 1930's-style violent protests
against the forced sale of homes. Morganthau, et al., Again the Fear of Foreclosure, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1983, at 12. Not surprisingly, the foreclosure phenomenon has also led to an
increased number of seminars offered to advise debt-ridden individuals of their legal and financial options. Califoreclosure,TIME, June 14, 1982, at 65. Finally, the increase of foreclosures
has not escaped the notice of America's popular culture. In 1985, immediately following the
London/Philadelphia Live Aid concert, which raised an estimated $65,000,000 for African
famine relief, rock musician Bob Dylan said, "Maybe they can take 1 or 2 million and use it
to pay the mortgages on some of the farms." ROLLING STONE 1985 YEARBOOK, December 19,
1985-January 2, 1986, at 63-64. Dylan's idea was the genesis of "Farm Aid: A Concert for
America," which raised $10,000,000 to assist American farmers facing enormous mortgage
debts. Id. at 64. In 1984, two major motion pictures, Places in the Heart (Tri-Star Productions), and Country (Disney Films), explored the ramifications of imminent foreclosure. In
1982, rock musician Bruce Springsteen recorded, "Johnny 99," a song which described the
frustrations of a man whose home was being foreclosed upon, and who had "debts no honest
man could pay." Nebraska (Columbia Records).
114. Gray, Annual Meeting, supra note 108, at 17. Payment shock and the specter of
foreclosure create obvious problems for the borrower, including: the trauma of losing one's
home, the loss of equity therein, the need to relocate, the enduring damage to one's credit
rating, and the ill-feeling within a family that might be engendered by the upheaval. Telephone interview with Mark A. Hiller (Jan. 24, 1985). Significant problems are also posed for
the lender. For example, there is currently some concern in the lending industry over "portfolio default," the phenomenon that could occur if interest rates rise and payment shock strikes a
lender's entire ARM portfolio because the ARMs are tied to the same index and adjustment
rate. Moser & Whiteley, Short Fuse on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1984, at 22, 23.
Additionally, as ARM foreclosures increase, so will a number of other pesky problems for a
lender: adverse publicity, business disruption, hostile consumer contact, as well as the threat of
litigation. Id. at 27. In 1986, farmers will be especially hard hit. See Coming: 'Massive' Farm
Foreclosures, San Francisco Examiner, January 1, 1986, at A-8, col. 1.
115. An ARM may be structured to include a life-of-loan cap in conjunction with either
of the other caps. Or, the loan can be structured to include only one of the types of caps, or
none of them. For a discussion of these last two loan types, see Miller, The New No-Limit
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vide the borrower with some reassurance that the mortgage payments won't go through the roof. But each carries with it a little
surprise.
The annualpayment cap limits the fluctuations in a borrower's
mortgage payments, so that payments will not change more than
once per year for as long as the cap is in effect.' 16 The cap does not,
however, place a lid on the interest rate increases for which a borrower will be responsible. 117 Rather, when interest rates are steady,
the loan payments remain stable." 8 But if interest rates rise to a
level beyond the capped monthly payments, then the difference is
added to the loan principal." 9
The periodic interest rate cap limits the fluctuations in the note
rate at each rate adjustment.' 2 This cap limits the borrower's payment increase or decrease accordingly. However, in years where the
market interest rate increases beyond the interest rate cap, the differ21
ence is carried over to the next adjustment period.'
A life-of-loan cap provides a ceiling which the note rate cannot
exceed over the life-of-the loan.' 2 2 Generally, this type of cap offers
the borrower the surest degree of protection against steep payment
increases. The life-of-loan cap, however, rarely uses the initial teaser
rate as a benchmark, but rather uses the note rate after the teaser
has expired.'2
Mortgage: Tailored for the FederalLenders, but Who Would Want One?" FIRST TUESDAY,
May 1981, at 11.
116. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4. A 7.5% annual payment cap is common among lenders which cap mortgage payment increases. Montgomery speech, supra note
104. But see Adjustable Mortgages, Soc'y, Sept./Oct. 1983, at 2, 3 (survey conducted by
American Mortgage Insurance Company showed that 79% of savings and loan associations do
not cap payment increases).
117. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4.
118. Guttentag speech, supra note 79.
119. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4. The amount added to the principal is
called negative amortization. See infra notes 124-31 accompanying text.
120. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4. One to two percent annual interest
rate caps are common. Asay, Pricing and Analysis of Adjustable Rate Mortgages, MORTGAGE BANKING,

121.

Dec. 1984, at 61, 62.

ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4. For example, a 1% annual interest
rate cap on an ARM at 15% would limit adjustments to the note rate after one year to 14%, if
rates were decreasing and 16%, if rates were increasing. If market rates actually moved upward 1.5%, then the note rate would go to 16% and a 0.5% increase would be carried over to
the next adjustment period; if market rates remained steady during that next adjustment period, the note rate would be bumped to 16.5%.
122. Thomas, Freddie Mac Guidelines, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1984, at 85, 96.
Typically, a life-of-loan cap is 5%, although it can be greater or smaller. Montgomery speech,
supra note 104.
123. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 4.For example, an ARM with a oneCAR,
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D. Negative Amortization
Negative amortization is an increase in the principal balance of
a mortgage caused by an insufficiency of the monthly payments to
cover accrued interest on the note.1 24 Before ARMs were introduced
in 1981, negative amortization was virtually non-existent, 2 5 although the concept, itself, is not new." 6
As is the case with caps and teasers, negative amortization is
controversial. It is defended on the ground that it effectively keeps
monthly mortgage payments low during the first few years when a
homeowner is least likely to be able to absorb sharp payment increases, while still protecting the lender against sudden upward
swings in interest rates.'

27

Negative amortization, on the other hand, potentially presents
both short and long-term problems for the borrower. In the shortterm, if property values are appreciating slowly but interest rates are
rising, then negative amortization can reduce a borrower's equity in
his property.' 8 In the long-term, a borrower may hit the 125% negyear 10% teaser rate will move to the market rate-for example, 12.5%-when the teaser
expires. If the loan has a 5% life-of-loan cap, then the maximum interest rate that could be
charged would be 17.5%, not 15%.
124. Moser & Whiteley, Short Fuse on ARMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1984, at
22, 42.
125. The conventional fixed-rate mortgage, as well as the variable interest rate mortgage
of the 1970s did not permit negative amortization. This is because both mortgages were structured to ensure that the monthly payments would completely retire the debt.
126. In the early part of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon for a sharecropper
working the land to owe more money at the end of the year than at the beginning. H. KESTER,
REVOLT AMONG SHARECROPPERS 48-49 (1969); Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 24
(statement of Rep. Wright).
127. Negative amortization "is the most important consumer benefit in the ARM," according to James Montgomery, quoted in Miller, Adjustable Mortgages Put on the Spot, San
Francisco Examiner, Dec. 9, 1984, (Homes), at 2. See also Sharplin, Negative Amortization:
Mistaking Grandmotherfor the Wolf, MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 1983, at 45, in which the
author argues that negative amortization "offers the only way" for lenders to maintain a high
level of lending activity during an inflationary period. "Far from being the 'big bad wolf'
many people see it as, negative amortization is Grandmother rushing to our rescue." Id. at 49.
The practice of permitting negative amortization is generally more popular with the larger
institutions. Pope & Cortes, In Search of the Standardized Mortgage, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Jan. 1983, at 15, 16. Pope and Cortes found that 48% of the S&L's with assets over $1 billion
permitted negative amortization in their ARMs, whereas only 8.3% of the S&L's with assets of
less than $100 million allowed negative amortization. Pope and Cortes speculate that the lenders with relatively small assets "may not have the capacity to service loans with negative amortization [since new] computer programs must be written and implemented to accomodate rising
loan balances." Id. at 16.
128. Thomas, Freddie Mac Guidelines, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 1984, at 85, 86;
Friedman, ProtectingLenders Against ARM Risks and Uncertainties,MORTGAGE BANKING,
Oct. 1981, at 82. Gray also acknowledges the possibility of negative amortization when prop-
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ative amortization limit, causing the lender to "recast" the loan.1" 9
Recasting the loan involves restructuring the borrower's monthly
payments upward to ensure loan pay-off by the end of the loan term.
Significant confusion surrounds the ramifications of loan recasting

and the 125% limit. 3 The result is hauntingly familiar, however,
because mortgage recasting is reminiscent of lending practices used
until 1929.'s'
E. Disclosure Problems
Like other creditors who regularly extend consumer credit,
lenders offering ARMs must comply with the Truth-in-Lending
erty values appreciate slowly, noting that the loan balance could grow to an amount beyond
what the property is worth and the borrower "may simply drop the keys to the house in the
mailbox." Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of Edwin Gray). This erosion of equity is more likely to occur in low and moderate income neighborhoods where property values tend to appreciate slowly. S. Rohde, Runaway Mortgages: A Review of the Early
Experience with UnrestrictedAdjustable Rate Mortgages and an Analysis of the Implications
of Negative Amortization, CENTER FOR COMUNITY CHANGE, July 27, 1981, at 28. Rohde
states that the erosion of equity in slowly-appreciating neighborhoods could lead to sharply
increased default rates, "or, in the alternative, the neighborhood may simply be redlined by
lenders seeking to minimize default risk." Id. See also R. TURNER, THE MORTGAGE MAZE,
172-73 (1982) (negative amortization in slowly-appreciating neighborhoods can cause "negative equity," defaults, and a "resurgence of redlining"). The prospect of negative amortizaion
in an ARM may also discourage lenders from extending morgage credit "to persons perceived
as having limited upward income mobility . . . such as minorities and women." Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 1, at 766 (statement of Allen Fishbein, Director, Neighborhood Revitalization Project).
129. Virtually all ARMs which permit negative amortization specify that when a certain amount of negative amortization has accrued, usually 125% of the loan balance, then the
lender may "recast" the loan. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra, note 25, at 4. When the loan is
recast, the borrower's equity may be eroded, perhaps completely, in addition to the borrower's
added burden of substantial payment increases. Id.
130. Many borrowers apparently believe that the 125% limit, sometimes marketed as a
"negative amortization cap," is a consumer protection device. Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 1, at 118-19 (statement of Jack Guttentag). The 125% limit, however, is designed to
allow the lender to subordinate the annual payment cap to the negative amortization cap. For
example, if interest rates are rising, many borrowers will elect to cap their annual mortgage
payment increases at 7.5% per adjustment. This results in the rapid accumulation of deferred
interest. When the 125% limit is reached, the lender can then adjust the monthly payments
upward by any amount for the loan to become fully amortizing. Id. at 118. Had it been
possible to purchase an ARM with this 125% limit and a 7.5% payment cap in 1977, payments would have increased by 7.5% each year for four years, and in the fifth year, when the
limit was hit, payments would have tripled. Gutenttag speech, supra note 79.
131. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 408 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez)
("[W]e are repeating in our own way the follies and errors of pre-1929"). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1418, accompanying the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, which is replete with
references to the benefits of long term amortization of home mortgages, and the difficulties
encountered by the homeowner in refinancing short-term obligations. H.R. REP. No. 1418,
72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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Act."2 The purpose of the Act is to ensure that a meaningful disclosure of credit terms is made. a This permits the consumer to compare
the various credit terms available, and to avoid the uninformed use
of credit." 4 The Act is implemented by regulations promulgated by
the Federal Reserve Board.'
Disclosure is particularly important in the context of ARMs.
Given the tremendous combination of rates, caps, maturities, and
other elements in today's ARMs, a potential borrower depends on
meaningful disclosure in selecting a mortgage.' Yet the Truth-inLending Act only requires a lender offering an ARM to disclose the
finance charge, amount financed, and the number, amount, and due
dates of payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness.'3 7 In the context of ARMs, the Act is therefore deficient because it fails to adequately regulate in the following three areas: timing of disclosure,
adequacy of disclosure, and uniformity of disclosure."'
At present, the disclosures mandated by the Truth-in-Lending
Act arrive too late to help the prospective borrower.' They are provided after the prospective borrower submits a loan application and
is already partially committed because he has paid loan application
fees.' 4 ° Thus, the requisite disclosures fail to provide much assistance
when shopping for a loan.' 4 '
132. Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1970).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
134. Id.
135. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.1503 (1981). The regulations are collectively known as
"Regulation Z."
136. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 655 (statement of Kent Colton, Exec.
V.P., National Association of Home Builders).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1638. The inadequacy of the required disclosures for variable rate
mortgages has been recognized at least since 1977. See, e.g., Comment, Variable Rate Mortgages: The Transition Phase, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 140, 147 (1977). When disclosures are
inadequate, there is a tendency for consumers to turn to intermediaries, such as real estate
brokers, for information. Yet because the main interest of intermediaries is usually to make a
sale and earn a commission, the information they provide is often biased. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 222 (statement of William Eskridge). Additionally, the intermediary
may be faced with a conflict of interest because [generally] the more expensive the sale, the
larger the commission. Id. at 264. The likelihood of this conflict existing has increased since
the Garn Act was passed in 1982. This is because the Carn Act repealed the provision of the
Truth-In-Lending Act which included "arrangers of credit" within the scope of the Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1602(0 (1982).
138. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 120 (statement of Jack Guttentag).
139. Id.
140. Id. Mortgage loan application fees vary; in some areas, borrowers must intitially
pay a $250 loan application fee before they receive the ARM disclosure information. Id. at
718 (statement of William Simpson, President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America).
141. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 120 (statement of Jack Guttentag).
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The disclosure statements, themselves, are deficient in that they
sometimes contain actual mistakes or relevant omissions."4 One aspect of ARMs which tends to be glossed over in disclosure statements is negative amortization. ' Assumability is another such neglected area."' Index adjustments1 4 and the lender's margin above
the index are other aspects of ARMs which are particularly ripe for
obfuscation. The failure of lenders to provide adequate disclosures
a fact acknowledged by
has contributed to consumer confusion,'
147
lending industry spokespersons.
Finally, disclosure statements are not uniform.14' This increases
the difficulty for potential borrowers to compare one loan package
with another. 149 The single piece of information which is common to
ARM disclosure statements is the Annual Percentage Rate
142.

Id. Additionally, reports of outright misrepresentation are not uncommon. CAR,

ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 14.

143. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 120 (statement of Jack Guttentag). Of
the "40 or 50" disclosure statements which Guttentag examined, none explained the implications of a negative amortization cap, nor provided an illustration of what happens if the cap is
reached. Id. The California Association of Realtors notes the same deficiency in loan disclosures (CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 2), as does Consumers Union, the non-profit
publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS magazine. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at
321 (statement of Harry Snyder, West Coast Director of Consumers Union).
144. In the wake of Fidelity Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. de laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)
and the Garn Act, lenders are no longer required to permit the buyers of a home to assume the
old mortgage at the old contract rate. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Instead, the
lender can demand significant adjustments in the mortgage. These adjustments, including
changes in the loan caps and new borrower qualification standards (CAR, ARM PRACTICES,
supra note 25, at 7), are not required to be disclosed by the Truth-in-Lending Act. See supra
note 137 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
146. CAR, ARM PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 1. Details of the consumer confusion
engendered by the lenders' disclosure practices are beginning to surface in several class action
suits which are based on the lenders' alleged fraud and misrepresentation. See, e.g., Leroy
Keely, et al. v. Great Western Savings, Santa Clara Cty. Super. Ct. No. P47105 (Complaint
filed on behalf of over 200 potential class members, October 2, 1985); Feroze P. Bhandara, et.
al. v. Fremont Bank, et al., Alameda Cty. Super. Ct. No. TR586944-6 (Third Amended Complaint filed on behalf of over 200 potential class members, June 18, 1985); Franklin Mayne, et
al. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n, San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 823583
(Third Amended Complaint filed on behalf of over 18,000 potential class members, March 12,
1985).
147. Subcommitee Hearings, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Edwin Gray). ("Unfortunately, not all [lenders] have achieved the levels of disclosure . . .we would like to see.");
William Barger, savings and loan executive, quoted in Furlong, Adjustable-Rate Loan Marketing Triggers Concerns, The Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1984, at Part V, at I ("It's a
problem of the marketplace . . . .We would be happy to be straightforward, but we couldn't
get any loans that way.").
148. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 120. (statement of Jack Guttentag).
149. Id.
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(APR).15 0
The problems of excessive diversity, teaser rates, caps, negative
amortization, and poor disclosure practices are the result of congressional acquiescence to the concept of a deregulated, adjustable loan
instrument. It is unlikely that these problems will be resolved by
anything short of congressional intervention. 15 ' As was the case once
before in this century, congressional legislation "is necessary to protect homeowners from foreclosure and to relieve them [from] the burden of excessive interest and principal payments."' 5 2
IV.

PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM

Anyone who believes in deregulation should not kid himself or
herself into believing that deregulation is a fait accompli from
now until the end of time.' 8
Given the problems described in the preceding section, it is not
surprising that members of Congress began to express concern over
the matter. In 1984, two separate and quite distinct efforts were
made to address the ARM issue: one in the Senate, 4 which
150. Id. The APR, however, is not a particularly useful piece of information because it
is calculated based on the assumption that the initial interest rate on the ARM will not change
during the life of the loan. Id. See also BANK OF AMERICA, CONSUMER INFORMATION REPORT No. 31, SHOPPING FOR ADJUSTABLE RATE CREDIT 2 (Oct. 1984).
151. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
152. Letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 19, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (April 13, 1933). Roosevelt's letter led to the introduction and passage of the
Home Owners Loan Act, which created a system of federal savings and loan associations, "to
promote the thrift of the people in a cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes
of their neighbors." S. REP. No. 91, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
153. Gray, Annual Meeting, supra note 108, at 13.
154. In the closing days of the 98th Congress, there was an attempt to pass comprehensive banking legislation. S. 2851, sponsored by Sen. J. Garn (R-Utah), proposed to close loopholes which allowed banks to evade federal laws prohibiting the operation of interstate
branches and the marketing of non-banking services. Additionally, S. 2851 continued the plan
for deregulation of the banking industry by sanctioning state-formed pacts to keep the larger
New York and California banks from opening branches in their regions in order to compete
with local banks. The House version of the bill, H.R. 5916, was much narrower, however,
focusing simply on the loophole closing aspects. Calmes, Critics Block Senate Action on Banking Deregulation Bill, 1984 CONG. Q. 2183. Shortly before the Senate approved its version
(see Calmes, St. Germain Jettisons Bank DeregulationBills, 1984 CONG. Q. 2342), Sen. H.
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) added an amendment which would have placed a 5% life-of-loan cap
on all ARMs for residential mortgage transactions less than $500,000. S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S10979 (Sept. 12, 1984). In describing his amendment, Sen. Metzenbaum singled out those lenders who do not provide a life-of-loan cap on their ARMs, calling
the practice "unfair." Id.
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and one in the House of Representatives, 1 5 which success-

fully generated a discussion of the ARM issue, but which produced
only a flaccid, non-legislative response.157 In sum, neither house of
Congress passed anything approaching the type of regulatory reform
which is needed to resolve the problems associated with ARMs.
Congress must address the ARM issue squarely. Congress must
first recognize that it bears the ultimate responsibility for the
problems which ARMs have engendered. This is because Congress
sanctioned the development of ARMs in the first place.'1 8 That Congress may have abrogated its public responsibility by approving in
1982 the massive deregulation of home financing virtually sight-un155. S. 2851, because of its broad deregulatory features differed so significantly from
H.R. 5916 that Rep. St. Germain, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, refused to let
the House version emerge from the Banking Committee. This effectively precluded the reconciliation of the House and Senate Bills; thus, the Senate version with its last minute ARM
amendment died. Calmes, St. Germain Jettisons Bank Deregulation Bills, 1984 CONG. Q.
2342. Rep. St. Germain said that he blocked the bill because, "it is obvious the Senate will not
consider it [the House version] unless we buy off on new and greatly expanded powers for
banks and other financial institutions . . . . This is not the stuff of quickie midnight conferences in the closing hours of the session." Id. St. Germain's statement appears to be a veiled
reference to what happened in 1982 when the House version of the Garn-St. Germain banking
deregulation bill was substituted in conference at the eleventh hour with the far broader Senate
version. See Calmes, Professor Runs the Show at House Banking, 1984 CONG. Q. at 2203. See
also supra note 67.
156. The House action in response to the ARMs problem took the form of three days of
hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Development of the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. The hearings were held during the summer of 1984, and
were not related to either S. 2851 or Sen. Metzenbaum's amendment to S. 2851. The purpose
of the hearings was to gather information on the use of ARMs in the marketplace, and to
determine if legislation was needed to regulate ARMs. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1,
at 1 (introductory statement of Rep. Gonzalez). After hearing several experts in the field of
mortgage banking present written and oral testimony forming a transcript in excess of 900
pages, the Subcommittee decided against proposing legislative action. See infra note 157.
157. The House Subcommittee decided to take three steps. First, the subcommittee
formed a task force comprised of various lenders in the respective lending associations for the
purpose of authoring a "Public Information Brochure on Adjustable Rate Mortgages." The
brochure is intended to improve consumer education. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at
453-55 (Letter from Reps. Fernand St. Germain, Henry Gonzalez, Chalmers Wylie, and
Stewart McKinney to Edwin Gray, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (August 1,
1984)). Second, Subcommittee Reps. Gonzalez and McKinney requested that § 226.18(f) of
Regulation Z (consumer disclosure requirements for variable rate transactions) be modified to
include a "worst case scenario" that would show the consumer the maximum potential
monthly mortgage payment for a particular ARM. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at
457-58 (letter from Reps. Henry Gonzalez and Stewart McKinney to Paul Volker, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board, (August 1, 1984)). Third, the Subcommittee resolved to continue to
"monitor the situation." Telephone interview with Ms. Bonnie Caldwell, staff member to the
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development (January 2, 1985).
158. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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seen 159 only heightens the congressional duty to consider fresh methods to eradicate the misery which deregulation has wrought. Neither
the courts 160 nor state legislatures"" are likely to supply the required
regulation.
The goals of congressional intervention should be to: 1) lessen
consumer confusion; 2) eradicate deceptive loan instruments; and 3)
push the pendulum of interest rate risk away from homeowners and
toward a more equitable location between homeowners and lenders.
Congress must endeavor to resolve the ARM problem, not just study
it, and not just leave the problem to industry self-regulation." 2 The
159. See supra note 67.
160. Cases involving ARMs are generally limited to issues raised in a specific transaction, such as ambiguous terms in the loan instrument, or particular disclosure irregularities.
Thus, the courts have yet to address the larger question of whether the regulations governing
ARMs provide adequate protection to the consumer. Even if a litigant were to challenge those
regulations directly, there would be the formidable hurdle presented by the courts' traditional
reluctance to act in a legislative capacity. If that hurdle could be overcome, then it would still
take several years to resolve the issue. The due-on-sale controversy, for example, was litigated
in California for well over a decade before the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the dispute in
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
161. State legislatures are not likely to regulate ARMs in a manner inconsistent with
Title VIII of the Garn Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-05). This is because Congress, in
passing the Garn Act, appears to have preempted the field. U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2. To
determine whether a federal enactment preempts inconsistent state regulations, the inquiry
begins with congressional intent. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Congressional intent to preempt may be found in an express statutory command or by implicit
legislative design. Id. Both explicitly and implicitly, the language of the Garn Act appears to
preempt inconsistent state legislation regarding ARMs. See 12 U.S.C. § 3801(b) ("It is the
purpose of this title to . . . authoriz[e] all housing creditors to make, purchase, and enforce
alternative mortgage transactions so long as the transactions are in conformity with the regulations issued by the Federal agencies."); 12 U.S.C. § 3803(2) ("The term 'housing creditor'
means depository institution . . . or any person who regularly makes loans ..
").
162. The industry self-regulation argument is suspect for three reasons. First, lenders
"have a vested interest in making the most profitable loan possible." Michael Jessee, Exec.
V.P., Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, quoted in Miller, Warning on 'Deep Discount' Mortgages, San Francisco Examiner, April 15, 1984, (Homes), at 1. Second, lenders act
in an intensely competitive environment, one which is not conducive to self-disclipine. Corrigan, U.S. Bank Deregulation: The Longer-term Consequences, THE BANKER, Aug. 1984, at
21, 24. Third, lenders are without a mechanism, except regulation, by which they can act
collectively. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 116 (statement of Jack Guttentag). Thus
far, self-regulation has permitted widespread consumer confusion, loan delinquencies, and
foreclosures. Industry experts expect this situation to become worse. Gray, Annual Meeting,
supra note 108, at 17. As one commentator observed, "Self-regulation is not happening ...
and it won't happen." Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 116 (statement of Jack Guttentag). A mortgage loan officer observed that'the self-regulation argument is akin to "placing
a bowl containing many candies in front of unsupervised children with instructions that each
could have one piece. How long would it last? The not-so-good child grabbing handfuls would
cause others to do likewise ....
" Letter from A. Mitchell Godwin, Conway National Bank,
to the Consumer Affairs Division of the Board of Govenors of the Federal Reserve System
(August 2, 1984).
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following proposed legislation meets these goals.
TITLE IX-ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE TRANSACTION
REGULATIONS' 63
SHORT TITLE
Sec. 901. This title may be cited as the "Alternative Mortgage
Transactions regulation Act of 1986."
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
Sec. 902(a) The Congress hereby finds that(1) the unchecked proliferation of types of alternative mortgage
instruments has created an over-abundance of home financing possibilities, has engendered widespread consumer confusion, and has
seriously impaired consumer efforts to make sensible decisions re164
garding home financing;

(2) the use of short-term, discounted mortgage interest rates to
qualify consumers for alternative financing has increased the number
of loan defaults and home foreclosures to intolerably high levels; 6
(3) the use of "caps" to limit fluctuations in alternative mortgage payments has not, in practice, been consistent with consumers'
reasonable expectations;' 66
(4) the use of "negative amortization" in alternative mortgage
transactions has significantly reduced consumers' equity;' 7 and
(5) current disclosure practices are abysmal, greatly adding to
the difficulty which consumers have in comparing various alternative
mortgage instruments.'"6
Sec. 902(b) The purpose of this title is to redistribute the interest
rate risk between housing creditors and consumers in an equitable
manner, to eradicate deceptive loan practices associated with alternative mortgages, and to improve and to standardize disclosure requirements for alternative mortgage transactions.
163. Title IX, The Alternative Mortgage Transactions Regulations Act, is intended for
codification immediately following Title VIII, The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982, contained at the end of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982.
Title VIII is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805. Thus, Title IX would be codified as 12

U.S.C. §§ 3806-3811.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

77-93 and accompanying text.
94-114 and accompanying text.
115-23 and accompanying text.
124-31 and accompanying text.
132-50 and accompanying text.
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DEFINITIONS
Sec. 903. As used in this title(1) the term "alternative mortgage transaction" means a loan or
credit sale secured by an interest in residential real property, a
dwelling, all stock allocated to a dwelling unit in a residential cooperative housing corporation, or a residential manufactured home (as
that term is defined in section 603(6) of the National Manufactured
Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974)(A) in which the interest rate or finance charge may be adjusted
or renegotiated;
(B) involving a fixed-rate, but which implicitly permits rate adjustments by having a debt mature at the end of an interval shorter
than the term of the amortization schedule; or
(C) involving any similar type of rate, method of determining
return, term, repayment, or other variation not common to traditional fixed-rate, fixed-term transactions, including without limitation, transactions that involve the sharing of equity or appreciation,
described and defined by applicable regulation;' 6 9
(2) the term "housing creditor" means(A) a depository institution, as defined in section 501(a)(2) of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980;
(B) a lender approved by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development for participation in any mortgage insurance program
under the National Housing Act;
(C) any person who regularly makes loans, credit sales, or advances secured by interests in properties referred to in paragraph
(1); or
(D) any transferee of any of them.
A person is not a "housing creditor" with respect to a specific
alternative mortgage transaction, if except for this title, in order to
enter into that transaction, the person would be required to comply
with licensing requirements imposed under State law, unless such
person is licensed under applicable State law and such person remains or becomes subject to the applicable regulatory requirements
70
and enforcement mechanisms provided by State law.'
(3) the term "discounted mortgage interest rate" means an in169.
Title VIII
170.
Garn Act.

The definition of an alternative mortgage transaction is identical to that used in
of the Garn Act. 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1).
The definition of a housing creditor is identical to that used in Title VIII of the
12 U.S.C. § 3801(2).
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terest rate used to qualify consumers who could not qualify at the
17 1
current market rates;

(4) the term "current market rate" means the most recent interest rate published for any of the following interest rate indices used
by the housing creditor as a basis for adjusting mortgage interest
rates(A) National Average Contract Interest Rate;
(B) Federal Home Loan Bank District Semiannual Average
Cost of Funds;
(C) Average Cost of Funds, All Federal Home Loan Bank
Districts;
(D) Federal Home Loan Bank District Monthly Weighted Average Cost of Funds;
(E) U.S. Treasury Bills Auction Average, 3 Months;
(F) U.S. Treasury Bills Auction Average, 6 Months;
(G) U.S. Treasury Notes and Bonds, Constant Maturity, 1
Year;
(H) U.S. Treasury Notes and Bonds, Constant Maturity, 3
Year; and
(I) U.S. Treasury Notes and Bonds, Constant Maturity, 5
7
1

Year;

1

(5) the term "cap" means any mechanism used by the housing
creditor to limit periodic payment adjustments in mortgage transactions and any mechanism used to limit the maximum payment adjustments possible during the life of loan; 73
(6) the term "negative amortization" means the amount of
money added by the housing creditor to the outstanding loan balance
when periodic mortgage payments are insufficient to fully amortize
the loan.1 7 '
REGULATIONS
Sec. 904(a). In order to ensure the equitable distribution of interest
rate risk between housing creditors and consumers- 1 5
171. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
172. The indices listed in § 903(4) of the proposed legislation are recognized by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board as "nine possible interest indices used for adjusting mortgage
loan interest rates up or down." FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, INTEREST
RATE INDICES FOR ADJUSTABLE MORTGAGE LOANS 1 (June, 1984).
173. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
175. The need for an equitable sharing of interest rate risk in ARMs is recognized by
lenders, realtors, and consumer advocates. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 635
(statement of James Montgomery on behalf of the United States League of Savings Institu-
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(1) periodic payment adjustments in alternative mortgage transactions shall not exceed a one percent adjustment in the interest rate
in any annual period, regardless of greater fluctuations during that
annual period in the index used by the housing creditor to determine
periodic payments;""6
(2) periodic payment adjustments in alternative mortgage transactions shall, under no circumstances during the entire loan amortization period, exceed the midpoint between the lowest and highest
published rates of any single index listed in Sec. 903(4) of this title,
provided that each of the lowest and highest published rates are
taken from a period not more than seven years preceding the loan
origination 177 regardless of greater fluctuations during the loan
amortization period in the index used by the housing creditor to determine periodic payments;
(3) the annual limit in subsection (1) of this section and life-ofloan limit in subsection (2) of this section shall be fixed according to
the contract rate at the loan origination;17 8 and
1 79
(4) negative amortization shall not be permitted.
tions, noting that it is essential that ARMs be structured so as "to never allow payment
shock"), at 618 (statement of John Wood, Chairman of the National Association of Realtors
Real Estate Finance Committee, noting that "a healthy balance must be struck between the
risk to the consumer . . . and [the loan instrument's] ability to protect lenders from interest
rate risk"), at 271 (statement of Jack Guttentag, noting that interest rate uncertainty should be
allocated "in the best possible way and, under existing circumstances, it is not done in the best
possible way because a lot of instruments are deceptive").
176. The 1%annual interest rate cap is already in use for ARMs underwritten by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 1, at 423 (statement of Marice Barksdale, Federal Housing Commissioner, HUD, noting
that the "most effective" protection in HUD ARMs is a 1%annual interest cap).
177. The requirement that lenders calculate the life-of-loan cap based on the midpoint
of interest rate fluctuations during the seven years preceding loan origination is intended to
permit borrowers to share in the benefit of information traditionally relied on by lenders. The
life of the average mortgage is seven years. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Lenders
consider this seven-year average and the expected interest rate fluctuations in pricing their
mortgages. Indeed, their reliance on this seven-year average was utilized to justify their enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. R. IRWIN, THE NEW MORTGAGE GAME 25 (1982). If
lenders price their 30-year mortgages with the notion that the mortgages will actually be retired or rewritten in seven years, it seems only fair that borrowers as a class should obtain
something in return for helping the lenders wipe these old loans off the books. Section
904(a)(2) recognizes this need by requiring lenders to limit life-of-loan interest fluctuations to
whatever amount is equal to one-half the fluctuations during the seven years prior to loan
origination.
178. Section 904(a)(3) will greatly reduce instances of payment shock and loan default.
See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
179. An across-the-board prohibition of negative amortization is supported by at least
60 national and local civil rights, labor, neighborhood, church, and consumer organizations.
These organizations include the National Urban League, National Urban Coalition, National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, National Association of Neighborhoods, Na-
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Sec. 904(b). In order to better ensure that meaningful disclosure is
made by housing creditors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board shall revise their respective regulations to facilitate the
development of a single, universal disclosure statement to be used by
all housing creditors,' 80 which shall include(1) type of loan description (e.g., ARM, GPARM, SAM, etc.,)
with a narrative explanation describing to the borrower the manner
in which the loan operates;
(2) dates of loan origination, monthly payments, and amortization period;
(3) loan principal and interest rate, including annual caps up to
one percent and a life-of-loan cap as specified in Sec. 904(a)(2);
(4) prominent listing of index to which payment adjustments
are tied;
(5) chart showing semi-annual performance of the index specified in Sec. 904(b)(4) in comparison with the other eight indices
specified in Sec. 903(4) for a period not less than seven years preceding the loan origination date;
(6) monthly payments for each year of the loan expressed in
dollars using both a straight-line extrapolation of current interest
rates and a worst-case scenerio showing the maximum monthly payments possible under this loan;
(7) the maximum amount of total money this loan could cost as
compared with a fixed-rate mortgage at the same interest rate used
at loan origination;
(8) what conditions, if any, the housing creditor will place on
the assumability of this loan;
(9) housing creditor's margin added to each monthly payment,
expressed in dollars, and expressed as a percentage of the borrower's
monthly payments.
tional Consumers League, Public Interest Research Group, and the National Rural Housing
Coalition. Joint Statement on Adjustable Mortgages, July 23, 1981, reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 779-88.
180. Numerous trade associations and lending industry experts support the standardization of ARM disclosure requirements. They include: the National Association of Realtors,
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 620 (statement of John Wood, Chairman of the
National Association of Realtors Real Estate Finance Committee); National Association of
Home Builders, id. at 654, 668, 672 (statement of Kent Colton, Executive V.P., National
Association of Home Builders); Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, id. at 722 (statement of William Simpson, President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America); Consumers
Union, id. at 311-12, 316 (statement of Harry Snyder, West Coast Director, Consumers
Union); Professor Jack Guttentag, id. at 120-21; Professor William Eskridge, id. at 224, 250;
Rep. Stewart McKinney id. at 334-35.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Sec. 904(c). In order that consumers are able to effectively utilize the
universal disclosures requirements mandated in Sec. 904(b), the universal disclosures set forth in Sec. 904(b) shall be available at no
charge from the housing creditor.' 8 1
Sec. 904(d) The universal disclosure requirements mandated in Sec.
82
904(b) shall be written in clear, plain English.'
APPLICABILITY
Sec. 905(a). The provisions of section 904 shall apply to all mortgage transactions originated 60 days after the date of enactment of
this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Sec. 906(a). This title shall be effective sixty days after the
enactment.
As explained below, this proposed legislation addresses each of
the five problem areas examined in Section III of this comment.
A.

Excessive Diversity

The excessive diversity of ARMs has given rise to two theories
on how best to attack the diversity problem. One theory is the "menu
approach," 18 and the other is the "relevant disclosure approach."
184 Sections 904(a) and 904(b) are an attempt to translate the beneficial aspects of both theories into practice. A specified menu of ARMs
is not mandated, so as not to compromise market creativity, innovation, and refinement. On the other hand, specific guidelines regarding caps, negative amortization, and disclosures are provided. These
guidelines will reduce the number of ARM instruments by: 1)
prohibiting the sale of those ARMs which fail to meet the guidelines
181. The idea that lenders should provide standardized disclosure information as a public service is advocated by Professor Jack Guttentag, Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at
120, and by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, id. at 590 (statement of Felix
Beck, President, Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
182. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
183. The menu approach involves defining a carefully constructed but limited list of
types of mortgages which, in combination, meet all of the essential needs of borrowers and
lenders. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note* 1, at 119 (statement of Jack Guttentag). The
various types of ARMs on the list would permit a range of interest rate risk-sharing between
borrowers and lenders. The problem with this approach is that the menu could become nonresponsive to the market. Id.
184. The relevant disclosure approach is based on the premise that borrowers can handle the diversity of ARM instruments provided that the disclosure practices are adequate. Id.
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specified; and 2) ensuring that only the most popular ARMs remain
in the marketplace because the enhanced disclosure requirements
will permit market forces to drive out the less popular instruments. 1 85 By checking the proliferation of ARM instruments, sections 904(a) and 904(b) will facilitate efforts by potential
homebuyers to thoroughly examine available home financing options.
Additionally, a trend toward standardization of ARM products will
make it easier for lenders to promote, originate, and service the
loans; the administrative ease associated with such standardization
will also have a positive impact on overhead costs. 8
B.

Teaser Rates

Section 904(a)(3) addresses the use of teaser rates to qualify
borrowers who cannot qualify for fixed-rate financing. Under section
904(a)(3), two problems will be resolved. First, lenders will be reluctant to continue the current practice of offering exceptionally low
initial rates because section 904(a)(3) fixes both the annual and lifeof-loan caps according to the initial contract rate. The result will be
fewer instances of payment shock and loan defaults because borrowers will no longer be qualified at ridiculously low rates, only to be
hit with sharp payment adjustments after one year.187 Second, section 904(a)(3) will eliminate the deceptive lending practice of letting
teaser rates expire, adjusting the interest rate upward, and then using that adjusted rate as a basis for calculating the annual and lifeof-loan caps.' 88 This practice will be eradicated because section
904(a)(3) specifies that the benchmark used for calculating loan caps
will be the interest rate used at loan origination.
185. The enhanced disclosure requirements are the missing link to support Gray's argument (see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text) that good ARM instruments will act to
drive out bad ARM instruments. Guttentag speech, supra note 79.
186. Mylod, ARMs: Cream of One Crop, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1983, at 13. A
move toward standardizing ARM instruments will also enhance their marketability in the
secondary mortgage market. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 609 (statement of Felix
Beck).
187. See supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text. Of course, fewer people may qualify for financing if the low teaser rates disappear. It merits questioning, however, whether or
not qualifying people who stand a high risk of defaulting on their mortgage debt is a desirable
public policy. Rep. James Wright has observed, "You don't do a person a favor if you lure
him into a debt that he can't pay. You don't do him any favor at all." Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 1, at 33.
188.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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C. Caps
Sections 904(a)(1)-(4) address the problem of those caps that
fail to safeguard the borrower against significant increases in
monthly mortgage payments. The proposed one percent annual interest rate cap would, for example, limit the first mortgage payment
increase on an $88,000 loan originated at fourteen percent to $70 per
month (See Table 1). This would provide borrowers with a great
deal of stability which is currently missing from ARMs, 1"9 while
redistributing the interest rate risk between borrowers and lenders.
The one percent cap, although it appears modest, is twice the annual
limit imposed on California lenders in the 1970s. 19° As shown in
Table 2, the one percent cap would also cover a substantial amount
of the annual fluctuations which occurred in the seven years between
1978 and 1984 in any of the nine indices specified in Sec. 903(4).1"1
TABLE 2
National
Average
Contract
Interest
Rate

June, 1978
December, 1978
June, 1979

December,
June,
December,
June,
December,
June,
December,
June,
December,
June,
December,

1979
1980
1980
1981
1981
1982
1982
1983
1983
1984
1984

9.27
9.85
10.46
11.59
12.88
13.15
14.40
15.53
15.01
13.44
12.21
11.94
11.79
12.26

Eleventh
District
Semiannual
Average
Cost of
Funds

6.59
6.89
7.49
8.07
9.51
9.47
11.14
12.50
12.08
11.71
9.91
9.98
9.97
-

Average
Cost of
Funds,
All FHLB
Districts

6.54
6.79
7.23
7.71
8.77
9.11
10.31
11.53
11.49
11.27
9.81
9.84
9.77
-

Eleventh
U.S.
U.S.
District
Treasury Bills
Treasury Notes
Monthly
Auction
and Bonds
Average
Constant Maturity
Weighted
Average
Cost of
3
6
1
3
5
Months Months Year Year Year
Funds
6.75
7.04
7.76
8.65
10.08
9.63
12.14
12.18
12.67
11.09
9.82
10.19
10.43
-

6.71
9.12
9.05
12.07
7.00
15.66
14.56
10.93
12.11
8.01
8.82
8.96
9.94
8.16

7.20
9.40
9.06
11.85
7.22
14.77
13.95
11.47
12.31
8.23
8.89
9.14
10.55
8.36

8.09
10.30
9.57
11.98
8.16
14.88
14.86
12.85
14.07
8.91
9.96
10.11
12.08
9.33

8.30
9.33
8.95
10.71
8.91
13.65
14.29
13.66
14.48
9.88
10.32
11.13
13.18
10.56

8.36
9.08
8.85
10.42
9.21
13.25
13.95
13.60
14.43
10.22
10.63
11.54
13.48
11.07

189. The amount of monthly payments is a consideration of vital importance to the
borrower since it is the factor most directly related to the possibility of default. Goebel v. First
Fed. S. & L. Ass'n of Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 266 N.W.2d 352, 356 (1978) (lender's failure
to provide explicitly for increase in monthly payments demonstrated that no such increase was
contemplated by the parties).
190. See supra note 47.
191.
In the Eleventh District Semiannual Cost of Funds Index, Eleventh District
Monthly Weighted Average Cost of Funds Index, and the Average Cost of Funds for all
Federal Home Loan Bank Districts Index, semi-annual fluctuations in the interest rate were,
with four exceptions each, approximately 1% or lower. Thus, the 1% annual limit would, for
these three indices, mean that the borrower and the lender were sharing the interest rate risk
fairly evenly even during periods of high interest rate volatility. For the remaining indices,
except the U.S. Treasury Bill Auction Average for 3 Months and 6 Months, there were six to
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The life-of-loan cap specified in Sec. 904(a)(2) is similarly intended to redistribute the interest rate risk equally between borrowers and lenders. The cap achieves this by being based on the midpoint in interest rate fluctuations during the seven years preceding
loan origination. Fluctuations above that midpoint must be borne by
the lenders, while flucuations below that midpoint can be borne by
the borrowers. Lenders would be free to choose from any of the nine
indices specified in Sec. 903(4) to fix the midpoint. In the 1978-84
period, for example, the index which showed the greatest difference
between the lowest and highest rates was the U.S. Treasury Bills
Auction Average for 3 Months (See Table 2). Between 1978 and
1984, this index showed movement of 8.95% between its lowest and
highest rates.19 The midpoint would therefore be 4.475%,1 B3 and
this would be the life-of-loan cap.
A two-fold benefit exists to the life-of-loan cap specified in Sec.
904(a)(2). First, neither the borrower nor lender is constrained by
whatever fixed percentage appeared reasonable at the date of loan
origination. Rather, a midpoint is selected from the preceding seven
years; thus, during prolonged periods of interest rate volatility, the
cap will tend to be higher, providing greater protection to the lender.
Because an interest rate midpoint will be used, rather than an average, sudden upward swings will also be reflected in a higher cap,
further protecting the lender. During prolonged periods of interest
rate stability, the borrower will benefit because the cap will be
lower. The result would be a rate-sensitive asset which, unlike many
of today's ARM instruments, still considers the ability of the borrower to meet monthly payments.
Second, the proposed life-of-loan cap would protect borrowers
against sudden and dramatic jolts in the monthly payment burden.
This protection, unlike today's caps, would be consistent with the
eight semiannual periods since 1978 when the interest rate increases exceeded 1%. During
those periods, a 1% annual limit would have resulted in the lenders shouldering a greater part
of the interest rate risk than would the borrowers. The two U.S. Treasury Bill indices, the
most volatile of all nine, experienced semi-annual interest rate increases which exceeded 1%
eight times for the 6 Month index and nine times for the 3-Month index. Table 2 statistical
information quoted in FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, INTEREST INDICES
FOR ADJUSTABLE MORTGAGE LOANS 1 (Dec. 1984).
192. In June, 1978, the index rate was 6.71%. By December, 1980, it had climbed to
15.66%. The difference between the two extremes is 8.95%.
193. 8.95% x
= 4.475%. The other eight indices in Sec. 903(4) fluctuated approximately between 6 and 8%, therefore, the midpoint on these would be approximately 3-4%. See
Table 2. Currently, many of the life-of-loan caps available are between 4-6%. Subcommittee
Hearings, supra note 1, at 483 (statement of David Maxwell, citing a survey conducted in
June, 1984, by the Federal National Mortgage Association.
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borrower's reasonable expectations of what the caps are supposed to
accomplish. Additionally, the caps promise to greatly increase the
marketabilty of ARMs 9 4
D. Negative Amortization
Section 904(a)(4) prohibits negative amortization. The prohibition is grounded in public policy; very few borrowers are enamored
with the Sisyphean concept of making monthly mortgage payments
for a few years, only to find that at the end of that period, they are
right back where they started, owing the same or more money than
the original loan principal. 95 The prohibition would not have a
harsh effect on lenders since the new caps will virtually eliminate the
very low initial payments which were the primary causes of negative
amortization. ' Elimination of negative amortization would also
eliminate the need for "negative amortization caps" and loan "recasting," two of the more confusing and potentially dangerous tools
currently used by lenders197
E.

Disclosure Problems

The universal disclosure statement proposed in Sec. 904(b)
should alleviate today's inadequate disclosure practices. The statement provides the consumer with a wealth of useful information in
clear language 98 at the initial "shopping stage" when it is most
needed. Disclosure would be at no initial cost and obtainable in
much the same way that a bank account holder discovers the interest
rates on various savings accounts. Given the infusion of computerization into the lending industry, 99 the requisite information would be
194. One FNMA survey showed that an interest rate cap increased the percentage of
people who found an ARM attractive from 26% to 72%. CAR, ARM PIACTIcEs, supra note
25, at 6. An American Mortgage Insurance Company survey, however, indicated that more
than one-half of the savings and loan institutions offering ARMs do not cap the potential
change in interest rates. Soc'v, Sep. Oct. 1983, at 2, 3.
195. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 1, at 580 (statement of David Maxwell, noting
that negative amortization "is not particularly popular with consumers"). A National Association of Realtors survey conducted in June, 1984, showed that 84% of ARM purchasers preferred ARMs that do not allow any negative amortization. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
I, at 620, 628 (statement of John Wood).
196. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
198. Clear language, free of technical and complicated terms, is essential if full disclosure is to be meaningful. An excellent example of the simple language which should be used in
disclosure statements can be found in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.7 (West Supp. 1985) (general
description of adjustable-rate loans).
199. Address by Richard Pratt, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco Annual
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easily accessible. The added expense of providing this service to consumers can readily be calculated and then factored into the lender's
margin with other loan servicing costs. In this way, the borrower
pays for the enhanced disclosure, yet the payment is spread over the
life of the loan, rather than being an initial cost.
Because borrowers will no longer have to pay several hundred
dollars before they obtain the necessary disclosures, they will be encouraged to shop vigorously for the best financing deal. This, in
turn, will compel lenders to be more aggressive in their pricing of
ARMs, a phenomenon which is certain to enhance the attractiveness
of ARMs to consumers.
Conceivably, even soundly designed ARMs could produce payment shock for borrowers whose wages or land values cannot keep
pace with higher interest rates. 0 ° Yet full disclosure should enable
borrowers to better understand their obligations and avoid the possibility of foreclosure, even during periods of high interest rates.20 1
Additionally, full disclosure will ensure that lenders carry out their
fiduciary duty2 " to act in the utmost good faith toward the
borrowers.2 03
Better disclosure will benefit lenders as well. Some of the unpleasant by-products of poor disclosure practices-adverse publicity,
business disruption, hostile customer contact, and litigation-will be
reduced if disclosure is enhanced and standardized. Adequate initial
disclosure should therefore be viewed not only as a necessary consumer safeguard, but also a key factor in reducing the lenders' potential legal exposure. 20 4 In short, a good general system of disclosure will go a long way toward reducing the dimensions of the
5
20

disclosure problem.

V.

CONCLUSION

In the same way we ban unsafe cars and unsafe drugs, we
Conference (Dec. 11,1984) (new computer technology has allowed the industry to keep track
of massive portfolios). See also Miller, Computer Jitters Rock Mortgage Industry, San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 4, 1984 (Homes), at 1-2.
200. Gray, Annual Meeting, supra note 108, at 15.
201. Id.
202. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1979).
203. Id.
204. Kaplan, Pitfalls in ARM Lending, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1984, at 94, 95.
205. Jack Guttentag, quoted in Miller, San Francisco Examiner, Dec. 9, 1984,
(Homes), at 1. Guttentag adds, "A streetwalker is meretricious only so long as she can stay in
dim light, and to a considerable degree, this is true of [ARMs] as well."
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°

Until 1981, lending institutions carried virtually all of the interest rate risk in home financing. After that date, however, the burden
was shifted to borrowers. The shift was facilitated by the adjustable
rate mortgage. Although home ownership opportunities have increased with the use of the ARM, so have loan defaults and foreclosures, as well as a host of deceptive lending practices. These
problems can be traced directly to congressional deregulation. To alleviate the problems and to ensure that lenders and borrowers share
the burden of carrying the interest rate risk, Congress must intervene. Limited reregulation is necessary.
The statutory reform proposed in this comment seeks to establish the equitable allocation of interest rate risk which is missing
from today's deregulated lending environment. The proposed reform
also seeks to eradicate the numerous deceptive loan practices, unfair
loan instruments, and inadequate disclosure statements which deregulation has permitted. In place of the current inequities, the proposed legislation endeavors to strike a responsible compromise between the lender's interest in profitability and the borrower's interest
in housing affordability.
David W. Miller

206. Richard Elbrecht, Mortgage Specialist, California Department of Consumer Affairs, quoted in Runde, A Buyer's Guide to the New Mortgages, MONEY, July, 1982, at 44,
50.

